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Abstract
This article presents a technique for proving problems hard for classes of the
polynomial hierarchy or for PSPACE. The rationale of this technique is that some
problem restrictions are able to simulate existential or universal quantifiers. If this
is the case, reductions from Quantified Boolean Formulae (QBF) to these restric-
tions can be transformed into reductions from QBFs having one more quantifier
in the front. This means that a proof of hardness of a problem at level n in the
polynomial hierarchy can be split into n separate proofs, which may be simpler
than a proof directly showing a reduction from a class of QBFs to the considered
problem.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Logic-Based Abduction 5
3 Default Logic 6
4 Planning 8
5 Conclusions 10
∗Dipartimento di Informatica e Sistemistica Antonio Ruberti, Universita` di Roma “La Sapienza”,
Via Ariosto 25, 00185, Roma, Italy. Email: paolo@liberatore.org
1
1 Introduction
Several logics-related problems are complete for classes of the polynomial hierarchy other
than NP and coNP. This is because these problem involve logical consistency and en-
tailment, which are already NP-hard and coNP-hard, respectively. Therefore, problems
that are defined in terms of a number of consistency or entailment verifications may be
complete for classes such as ∆p2[logn], ∆
p
2, or even for higher classes when this number is
exponential. An example of a problem that can be formulated in terms of an exponential
number of such operations is that of checking the existence of a formula that is equivalent
to a given one and of size bounded by a given number k. This problem can indeed be
expressed as follows: if k is larger than the given formula, the answer is ”yes”; otherwise,
guess a formula of size bounded by k and check equivalence (mutual entailment) to the
given formula. This problem is therefore in Σp2. Hardness to the same class has been
proved in particular cases [HW97].
Several results of Σp2-hardness and Π
p
2-hardness have been published since the be-
ginning of the 90s [Got92, Sti92, EG92, EG93, CL94, CDS94]. Some problems have
even been proved to be hard for classes at the fourth level of the polynomial hierarchy
[EG96, EGL97, DT02, ETW05].
For example, the problem of relevance in skeptical default abduction based on minimal
explanations is Σp4-complete. This has been proved by Eiter, Gottlob, and Leone [EGL97]
by showing a reduction such that a QBF in the form ∃X∀Y ∃Z∀K.F is valid if and only
if a certain hypothesis is in some minimal explanations of a certain problem of skeptical
default abduction. Such a proof is relatively complicated, as it requires showing that, if
there exists an evaluation of the variables X such that for all possible evaluation of the
variables Y , etc. then the hypothesis is in some minimal explanation, and vice versa. As
a comparison, a proof of NP-hardness done by reduction from propositional satisfiability
only involves an evaluation of the variables in X .
The technique proposed in this article simplifies such proofs by requiring only one
quantifier at time to be considered. This may not necessarily simplify the search for a
reduction, but allows its formal proof to be split into a number of simpler sub-proofs.
In particular, the idea is to start from the assumption that a reduction from QBF to
a given problem works, and show that this reduction can be ”raised”, that is, modify in
such a way the QBF has a single more quantifier in the front. For example, assume that a
problem has been proved Πp3-hard by a reduction from QBFs in the form ∀Y ∃Z∀K.F to
a given problem is already known. In some cases, we can use this reduction to produce a
new reduction from QBFs in the form ∃x∀Y ∃Z∀K.E to the problem under consideration,
where x is a new variable. If this step can be iterated for a polynomial number of times,
that would result in a proof of Σp4-hardness. The (iterated) addition of a single quantifier
2
raised a Πp3-hardness proof to a Σ
p
4-hardness proof.
Formally, let P be problem under consideration, and assume that I is a translation
from a class of QBFs into P . This means that every formula Q.E, where Q is a sequence
of quantifiers and E a propositional formula, is translated into an instance I(Q,E) of P
such that:
Q.E is valid iff I(Q,E) ∈ P
For any formula F containing a variable x, we let F |x=v, where x is a variable and v is
either true or false, be the formula obtained by replacing each occurrence of x with v. By
this replacement, F |x=v does not contain the variable x. For example, ((y∧¬x)∨x)|x=true
is (y ∧ ¬true) ∨ true. This formula is equivalent to true but syntactically different to it.
If F is a propositional formula containing only variables in Q and another variable x
which is not in Q, then both Q.F |x=true and Q.F |x=false are well-formed QBF formulae,
since both F |x=true and F |x=false only contains variables in Q. Note that neither Q.F |x=true
nor Q.F |x=false contain the variable x. Since Q.F |x=true and Q.F |x=false have the same
sequence of quantifiers Q, they can both be translated to P :
Q.F |x=true is valid iff I(Q,F |x=true) ∈ P
Q.F |x=false is valid iff I(Q,F |x=false) ∈ P
Depending on the reduction I, the two instances I(Q,F |x=true) and I(Q,F |x=false)
may be similar. If this is the case, one can try to merge them into a single instance
I ′(Q,F, x) such that:
I ′(Q,F, x) ∈ P iff


I(Q,F |x=true) ∈ P
or
I(Q,F |x=false) ∈ P
(1)
If such a merge is possible, it produces an instance I ′(Q,F, x) which is in P if and
only if ∃xQ.F is valid (note that F contains x):
∃xQ.F iff I ′(Q,F, x) ∈ P
If this step can be iterated a linear number of times while not super-polynomially
increasing the size of the generated problem instances, then one has a reduction from
the validity of ∃XQ.F to P .
3
The key to the proof is Equation 1: the two instances of P can be merged. These
two instances I(Q,F |x=true) and I(Q,F |x=true) are not arbitrary instances but the result
of translating two QBFs with the same quantifier and similar matrixes.
This is often possible. In practice, many translations from QBFs to logic-based
problems use the matrix of the QBF “as is”, by simply copying it verbatim in some
part of the instance of the problem P . In this case, I(Q,F |x=true) and I(Q,F |x=false)
are the same except for the part containing the matrix, where they only differ because
one contains F |x=true and the other contains F |x=false. In some cases, these two instances
can be merged by simply taking I(Q,F |x=true), replacing F |x=true with F , and minimally
modifying the rest of the instance in such a way the answer can be expressed in terms
of the answers to the two subproblems obtained by setting x = true and x = false.
This merge needs not only to be possible, but also to generate instances such that
merging can be applied again. If this iteration is possible while keeping the instance size
polynomial, hardness can be raised of one level in the polynomial hierarchy. Consider
a problem that has been proved Πpn-hard by a reduction from QBF to it. By iterating
the step of adding an existential quantifier, one obtains a proof of Σpn+1-hardness for the
same problem.
This whole process may appear complicated at first, but is actually easier to perform
to specific problems than to explain in its general form. One thing that one may easy
overlook when considering specific problems is that of assuming that Q.F is a QBF. This
is not the case, as F contains the variable x, which is not in Q; as a result, Q.F is not
a well-formed QBF. The QBFs mentioned in the proof are Q.F |x=true, Q.F |x=false, and
∃xQ.F . This is also reflected in the problem instances: I(Q,F |x=true) and I(Q,F |x=false)
do not contain the variable x because x is not mentioned in Q, F |x=true, and Fx=false (in
the latter two formulae x is replaced by true and false, respectively.) The variable x only
occurs in the instance I ′(Q,F, x).
A similar method can be used to prove that a universal quantifier can be added in
front of a QBF. The only part that changes is that the merged instance is in P if both
the two original instances are in P . In other words, the “or” in the right-hand size of
Equation 1 is replaced by “and”.
In the following sections, we apply this technique to logic-based abduction [Pei55,
BATJ91, EG95, CMP96, EGL97, EM02, LS07], default logic [Rei80, Got92, CS93, Ant99,
BG02], and planning [FN71, BN92, Byl94, BJ95, Koe96]. In the first case, we add
existential quantifiers, in the second universal quantifiers, and in the third both kinds.
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2 Logic-Based Abduction
We consider the problem of checking the existence of explanations in logic-based abduc-
tion. This is in essence the problem of making hypotheses over the possible causes of
observable manifestations [Pei55]. Formally, an instance of the problem of logic-based
abduction is a triple 〈H,M, T 〉, where H is a set of propositional variables (hypothesis),
M another set of propositional variables (manifestations), and T a propositional formula
relating H and M . An explanation is a subset S ⊆ H such that S ∪ T is consistent
and S ∪ T |= M . Checking whether an explanation for an instance 〈H,M, T 〉 exists is
Σp2-complete [EG95]. We provide an alternative proof using raising.
The starting point is a proof of coNP-hardness, which is easy to give: a formula E
is inconsistent if and only if the following problem has explanations: hypotheses H = ∅,
manifestations M = {a}, theory T = {¬E ∨ a}.
In this reduction, the formula is copied as is in the theory of the abduction problem.
As a result, two formulae E|x=true and E|x=false are translated into two abduction instances
differing only for the value of x of the theory T . We show that two such instances can
merged into a single instance with a moderate increase of size.
Lemma 1 For every H, M , T , the instance 〈H ′,M ′, T ′〉 has exactly all explanations of
〈H,M, T |x=true〉 with x
+ added to each and all explanations of 〈H,M, T |x=false〉 with x
−
added to each, where variable x does not occur in H and M , variables x+, x−, and q do
not occur in H, M , and T , and:
H ′ = H ∪ {x+, x−}
M ′ = M ∪ {q}
T ′ = T ∪ {x+ → q, x− → q, x+ → x, x− → ¬x,¬x+ ∨ ¬x−}
Proof. Let S be an explanation of 〈H ′,M ′, T ′〉. Since q ∈ M ′, and this variable only
occurs in the clauses x+ → q and x− → q, then either S ∪T |= x+ or S ∪T ′ |= x−. Since
x+ and x− does not occur positively in T ′, this means that either x+ ∈ S or x− ∈ S, but
not both, since otherwise S would not be consistent with T ′.
The explanations containing x+ are exactly the explanations of 〈H,M, T |x=true〉 with
x+ added to each. Indeed, x+ ∈ S makes S∪T ′ equivalent to S∪T |x=true∪{¬x
−, q, x}, and
T |x=true, H , andM do not contain x
−, q, and x. Similarly, the explanations containing x−
are exactly the explanations of 〈H,M, T |x=false〉 with x
− added to each. As a result, the
set of explanations of 〈H ′,M ′, T ′〉 is (apart from x− and x+) the union of the explanations
of 〈H,M, T |x=true〉 and of 〈H,M, T |x=false〉.
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This lemma proves that two similar instances of abduction can be combined into a
single one having the union of their explanations (apart from some variables added to
each). As a result, if one is able to translate two QBFs Q.F |x=true and Q.F |x=false, then
one can combine the resulting two instances into a single one that has explanations if
and only if ∃xQ.F . In order to prove the hardness of the problem, one only needs to
analyze the increase of size due to merging.
Theorem 1 (Alternative proof; originally proved by Eiter and Gottlob [EG95])
The problem of explanation existence is Σp2-hard.
Proof. A QBF of the form ∀Y.F is valid if and only if the problem of abduction
〈∅, {a}, {¬E ∨ a} has explanations. This reduction has the property that the matrix
of the QBF is copied verbatim in the theory of the abduction instance.
Let us now assume the existence of a reduction with the same property from from
QBFs having Q as their sequence of quantifier to abduction instances exists. If F is a
formula made of variables of Q plus x, one can apply the previous lemma: 〈H ′,M ′, T ′〉
has explanations if and only if either 〈H,M, T |x=true〉 or 〈H,M, T |x=false〉 has, where
〈H,M, T |x=true〉 and 〈H,M, T |x=false〉 are the results of translatingQ.F |x=true andQ.F |x=false,
respectively. As a result, ∃xQ.F is valid if and only if 〈H ′,M ′, T ′〉 has explanations.
What remains to be proved is that iterating this process does not generate instance
of super-polynomial size. This is in this case straightforward, as each merge only adds a
constant number of variables and binary clauses to the instance.
In this proof, it may look like 〈H,M, T 〉 is an abduction instance involved in the proof.
However, it is not. The instances used in the proof are 〈H ′,M ′, T ′〉, 〈H,M, T |x=true〉, and
〈H,M, T |x=false〉. In other words, H and M are meant to be used only with T |x=true and
T |x=false while T is meant to be used (with some formulae added to it) only with H
′ and
M ′.
More generally, the two instances corresponding to Q.F |x=true and Q.F |x=false only
contain the formulae F |x=true and F |x=false, respectively, and not the formula F , which
is instead contained in the merged instance. In particular, F contains the variable x,
which is not mentioned in the two QBFs Q.F |x=true and Q.F |x=false; x is the variable of
the merged instance that makes the merged instance become equivalent to one of the
two original ones when assuming the value true or false.
3 Default Logic
In this section, we show how a reduction from QBF to the problem of skeptical entailment
in default logic can be raised by the addition of a universal quantifier. This allows for
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an alternative proof of Πp2-hardness of this problem. Default logic has been introduced
by Reiter [Rei80]; several variants have been proposed since then [Luk88, Sch92, Ant99,
Lib07]. The problem of checking whether a default theory skeptically entails a formula
is Πp2-complete [Got92, Sti92].
The Πp2-hardness of a problem can be established by showing a reduction from
∀∃QBFs to the problem. The starting point is a simpler reduction from ∃QBF; this
reduction is then raised by the addition of universal quantifiers. The starting reduc-
tion is easy to give: a propositional formula E is satisfiable if and only if 〈{ :a∧E
a∧E
}, ∅〉
skeptically entails a, where a is a variable not contained in E.
This is a reduction from ∃QBF to the problem of skeptical entailment in default
logic. The QBF is translated in such a way its matrix only occurs once, as is, in the
resulting defaults. Two default theories obtained by translating two QBFs having the
same quantifiers and differing only for the value of a variable in the matrix can be merged
as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For every set of defaults D and variable q not occurring in D, the extensions
of the following theory are exactly the extensions of 〈D|x=true, ∅〉 with x and p added to
each and the extensions of 〈D|x=false, ∅〉 with ¬x and p added to each.
T =
〈{
: xp
xp
,
: ¬xp
¬xp
}
∪
{
p ∧ α : β
γ
∣∣∣∣∣ α : βγ ∈ D
}
, ∅
〉
Proof. Since the first two defaults of T are mutually inconsistent, and they are the only
ones that are applicable to the background theory, each extension of this default theory
contains either {x, p} or {¬x, p}. The extension of T are therefore exactly the extensions
of 〈D, {x, p}〉 and of 〈D, {¬x, p}〉. In turn, these two theories have the same extensions
of 〈D|x=true, ∅〉 and of 〈D|x=false, ∅〉, apart from x and q.
This lemma proves that two similar default theories can be merged into a single one
having the extensions of both. Since skeptical entailment is considered, the latter theory
implies a formula a if and only if both the two former theories do. If the two theories
result from translating Q.F |x=true and Q.F |x=false, the merged theory therefore entails a
if and only if ∃xQ.F is valid.
Theorem 2 (Alternative proof; originally proved by Gottlob [Got92] and Stillman [Sti92])
Skeptical entailment in default logic is Πp2-hard.
Proof. A formula ∃Y.E is valid if and only if 〈{ :a∧E
a∧E
}, ∅〉 skeptically entails a. In this
reduction, the matrix of the QBF is copied verbatim in the justification of one default,
and does not otherwise affect the default theory.
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Let us now assume that a similar translation from QBFs having Q as their sequence
of quantifiers to skeptical default entailment exists. We show a translation from QBFs
having ∃xQ as their sequence of quantifiers.
Let ∃xQ.F be such a formula. By assumption, Q.F |x=true and Q.F |x=false can be
translated into two default theories where F |x=true and F |x=false only occur as the jus-
tification of a single default. As a result, the two theories corresponding to Q.F |x=true
and Q.F |x=false can be written as 〈D|x=true, ∅〉 and 〈D|x=false, ∅〉, respectively, for some
set of defaults D. One can then apply the previous lemma, which proves that these two
theories both skeptically entail a if and only if T skeptically entails a. In other words,
T |= a if and only if ∃xQ.F is valid. By construction, the translation from ∃xQ.F to T
has the same property that the matrix F is translated verbatim in a default.
In order to complete the proof, we calculate the increase of size of the involved default
theories when the addition of quantifiers is iterated. This increase of size is that two new
defaults (of constant size) are introduced, and a variable is added to the precondition of
each default. As a result, this step can be iterated with only a quadratic increase of size,
thus obtaining a reduction from ∃∀QBF to skeptical default entailment.
4 Planning
The problem of establishing the existence of a plan in STRIPS [FN71] is PSPACE-
complete [BN92, Byl94]. We can use the method of raising for proving the hardness of
this problem. In this case, we have to show that both ∃x and ∀x can be added to the
front of a QBF while only producing a constant increase of size in the corresponding
planning instance.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider an extension in which the precondition of each
action is a propositional formula, rather than a list of positive and negative literals. An
action is therefore a pair 〈P,C〉 where P is a formula and C is a list of literals. This
action is executable if P is valid in the current state; its effect is to make all literals of
C valid.
Clearly, checking whether a formula containing no variable is valid can be translated
into a problem of plan existence. Given such a formula E, just build the action 〈E, {a}〉,
where a is a (new) variable, and have a being false in the initial state and required to be
true in the goal. This instance has a plan (composed of a single occurrence of the only
action it contains) if and only if E evaluates to true.
This is a translation from QBFs with no quantifiers to the problem of planning. The
matrix of the QBF is translated verbatim in the precondition of one action; the goal is
a single variable. Let us now assume that such a translation from QBFs having Q as
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their sequence of quantifiers exists, and prove the existence of a similar translation from
QBFs with a single more quantifier in the front.
In order to add an existential quantifier ∃x, we add a new variable p which is initially
false, we add two actions 〈¬p, {x, p}〉 and 〈¬p, {¬x, p}〉, and add p as a precondition of
all other actions. This way, p is required to be true before executing all other actions,
which is only possible if x is made either true or false; once x has been given a value, p is
also made true. This makes x unmodifiable, because the first two actions can no longer
be executed, and no other action makes p false or changes the value of x. This way, a
plan exists if and only if the instance corresponding to either Q.F |x=true or Q.F |x=false has
a plan. The increase of size is of two new actions, plus one more literal in each action.
A universal quantifier is added as follows. Assume that x is the variable we want to
quantify, and that the goal a is the postcondition of a single action. We add two new
variables b and p, both false in the initial state, and change the goal from a to b. We
also add p as a precondition to all other actions, and the following three actions.
a1 = 〈¬p, {x, p}〉
a2 = 〈a ∧ x, {¬x,¬a}〉
a3 = 〈a ∧ ¬x, {b}〉
In the initial state, only the first action is executable. It makes x true and all other
actions executable. Let P be an irredundant plan of this instance. The last action of P
is a3, since is the only action that makes the goal b true. This action requires both a to
be true and x to be false. This means that, at some point, a2 has been executed as well,
since this is the only action that makes x false. As a result, we have that P starts with
a1, contains a2, and ends with a3. Let P1 and P2 be the segments of P between a1 and
a2 and between a2 and a3, respectively. We have that P1 is a sequence of actions that
makes a true while x is true; P2 makes a true while ¬x is true. In other words, P1 and
P2 are plans for the case in which x is assumed true and false, respectively.
All considered reductions have the following two properties: a. the matrix of the QBF
only appears in the precondition of a single action and does not affect the rest of the
planning instance; and b. the goal is a single variable. Given a reduction with these two
properties, one can create a new reduction from QBFs with a single more quantifier in
the front.
We omit the formal proof of PSPACE-hardness. We have informally proved that both
an existential and a universal quantifier can be added to a QBF so that the corresponding
planning instance only gain moderately in size. In particular, both changes add only two
or three actions of constant size, and only add a single precondition to all other actions.
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This means that the instance that results from adding n quantifier has at most 3 ∗ n
actions, and each action is at most m+ n large, where m is the size of matrix.
5 Conclusions
The method shown in this article allows for proving a result of hardness for a class of the
polynomial hierarchy without directly building a reduction from the problem of validity
of a class of QBFs. The idea is that a proof of Σpn-hardness can be built by first showing
that the problem is Πpn−1-hard, and then showing that the particular instances used in
this hardness proof are able to “simulate” an existential quantifier. In the same way,
one can prove Πpn-hardness from a Σ
p
n−1-hardness proof. This technique is shown here
for explanation existence in logic-based abduction (Σp2-hard), for skeptical default logic
entailment (Πp2-hard), and plan existence in an extension of STRIPS (PSPACE-hard);
in a previous article, it has been used to prove the Πp4-hardness of a problem related to
redundancy in default logic [Lib05].
This technique can be used in two ways: either for all quantifiers or for the last
one. For example, in the case of planning we have shown that planning instance can al-
ways simulate existential and universal quantifiers, therefore raising a Σp0-hardness result
to PSPACE-hardness. On the other hand, the proof of Σp4-hardness of the problem of
background theory redundancy in default logic [Lib05] is based on first showing the prob-
lem Πp3-hard using a “classical” reduction from QBFs, and then proving that existential
quantifiers can be added, therefore raising this result to Σp4-hardness.
The main advantage of this technique is the simplification of the proofs. While a proof
of Σp4-hardness would require considering a QBF in the form ∃X∀Y ∃Z∀W.F , raising an
hardness result only requires to prove that two similar instances of the problem can be
merged in the appropriate way. This means that considering complicated QBFs may not
be necessary.
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